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Hegel and the Philosophy of Food* 
 
 Let me preface my discussion of Hegel’s Practical Philosophy with one wholesale 
concession.  At least for present purposes I propose to allow that Hegel’s writings in practical 
philosophy mean exactly what Robert Pippin says they mean.  So when Hegel tells me that “identity is 
absolute negativity because the notion has its complete external objectivity in nature,” or that “spirit 
raises its existence into Thought and thereby into an absolute antithesis, and returns out of this 
antithesis, in and through the antithesis itself,” I shall defer to Pippin to decipher the Hegelian code.1  
Of course I do not mean to suggest that Pippin’s interpretation of Hegel’s distinctive idiom is beyond 
controversy.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  Pippin’s work on Hegel has been intensely 
controversial for two decades now; indeed it is fair to say that he has sparked an interpretative war in 
Hegel studies, with battle lines now sharply drawn and no hint of a cease-fire on its way.  But I propose 
to leave that interpretative quarrel to others – partly because I have no stomach for it myself, but 
mainly because I want here to pursue a different sort of task:  assessing the philosophical position that 
Pippin attributes to Hegel and develops with considerable subtlety in this new book. 
 In thinking about just what that position is, I find it useful to make use of a device that Pippin 
himself uses on several occasions:  the high-altitude sketch.  I see Pippin’s Hegel as situated on a field 
of battle, surrounded by philosophical opponents.  Some of the opponents carry banners from one or 
another source in the history of philosophy, but the positions themselves are all represented by 
powerful contemporary advocates.  This, indeed, has been one of the most striking (and controversial) 
of Pippin’s accomplishments over the past twenty years:  against all odds he has managed to make 
Hegel our philosophical contemporary in current discourses across a wide range of themes and 
disputes.  And he has done so, I might add, almost single-handedly. 
 So who are the opponents faced by this 21st century Hegel?  From my high-altitude vantage, 
the opponents are too numerous to count, so my survey is anything but exhaustive.  For present 
purposes I shall focus on four.  Two of the opposed positions march under the banner of Philosophical 
Naturalism, although their respective positions share little in common.  The first is what I think of as 
Ancient Naturalism, although it is a position that has been gathering a considerable contemporary 
following.  Ancient Naturalism is a form of normative naturalism -- a thesis about living well.  But it is 
built on a metaphysical foundation:  it is committed to a robust form of teleological essentialism about 
living beings.  Understanding what a life form is, according to this view, involves understanding what 
it is for it to live well.  For the normative naturalist, the good for human beings involves living in 
accord with man’s essential nature.  To be sure, the Ancients had their differences about what that 
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essential nature amounted to, but they were in very broad agreement that one could not live well 
without being true to it. 
 If the Ancient Naturalist privileges teleological causation in this normatively substantial way, 
the Modern Naturalist tends to give privilege to efficient or mechanical causation.  For the Modern 
Naturalist, authoritative explanation comes from the natural sciences.  Accordingly, the authoritative 
explanation of human behaviour (including human action) consists in an account of the distinctive 
operations of the bio-mechanical entity that a human being is.  Modern Naturalism now comes in a 
thousand flavours; in its most extreme versions, it proposes to dispense with the notion of rational 
agency altogether – so much jetsam to be abandoned with folk psychology.  Less extreme varieties 
propose one or another reductive account of human action, drawing on the resources of neuro-
physiology, evolutionary biology, empirical psychology, and so on. 
 A third hoard of opponents can be grouped together under the heading of Relativism.  On this 
familiar position – much descried but perennially tempting – the wisdom of practical philosophy is, in 
effect, that there is no such wisdom, or certainly no final wisdom, no such thing as the human good, the 
just political order or the right organization of man’s affairs.  There are only so many, infinitely varied, 
temporally and culturally located norms and virtues. 
 The final camp of opponents – or at least the final one that I shall concern myself with here – 
comprises the Quietists.  The Quietists tend to favour a therapeutic model of philosophical work.  But 
unlike the therapists of the ancient schools, these modern Quietists follow the Wittgensteinian maxim 
to avoid the construction of philosophical theories, whether of human agency, human freedom, or the 
human good.  Philosophical work, insofar as there is any, consists not in answering the old vexing 
questions (what is an action?, is there free will?, what is the good?, etc.) but in learning to recognize 
that such questions are dispensable and perhaps best lost, that our ordinary discourse of human action 
and practical reasoning stands in no need of support from any distinctively philosophical discourse or 
theorizing. 
 It may seem obvious that a Hegelian position stands implacably opposed to all four of these 
opponents.  The Quietists are suspicious of philosophical theorizing; Hegel is surely the patron saint of 
grand philosophical theory.  The Relativists reject above all any claim to Absolute Knowledge; yet this 
is exactly what Hegel seems to claim as his crowning achievement.  Modern Naturalists see empirical 
natural science as the privileged form of knowledge; for Hegel that privilege belongs to philosophy as 
speculative thinking.  The case of the Ancient Naturalists may be the most complex.  Hegel 
consistently professes a deep regard for the Ancients, but he always tempers his praise with the thought 
that the Greek synthesis was somehow one-sided, incomplete, unstable.  Moreover, the central lacuna 
Hegel alleges in Ancient thought is also the centerpiece of Hegel’s Practical Philosophy:  the idea, and 
the ideal, of human freedom. 
 So how does Pippin’s Hegel engage these opponents?  His approach is surprisingly 
concessive.  Start with the Modern Naturalists.  Diehard opponents of modern scientific naturalism 
typically insist that natural scientific explanation can never capture the characteristic features of human 
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consciousness, human cognition, human intentionality generally.  Yet Pippin allows that neurological 
descriptions of cognition and evolutionary-biological descriptions of ethical dispositions are 
“undeniably possible” (48).  What does Pippin’s Hegel say to his Relativist opponents?  Well, he says a 
lot.  But one insistent theme runs like this: “there is nothing left to ‘counting as a rational norm’ than 
being taken to be one, effectively circulating as one in a society, acquiring the authority that is 
determinative for what happens … ” (198).  Relativists may be surprised to find themselves with a 
Hegelian ally!  What about the Quietists?  Surely Hegel is the consummate Noisy philosopher, who 
recognizes a deep and fundamental place for generalizing philosophical theory in the well-functioning 
human society.  That may be, but Pippin’s Hegel manages to find quite a lot of common ground with 
the Quietists as well.  “[T]he ethical world is alright by itself, and requires no instruction or 
philosophical justification.  … [C]onsiderations adduced in philosophy … are not and could not be 
practical reasons” (268).  The case of Ancient Naturalism is once again the most complex; indeed I 
would like to suggest that perhaps Pippin’s Hegel needs more from Ancient Naturalism that he allows.   
But once again we find a significant concessive note in Pippin’s account of Hegel’s relation to the 
Ancients; indeed it is in Aristotle that Pippin finds one of Hegel’s closest philosophical brethren. 
 But of course all this concession is just part of the story – a characteristically Hegelian part, I 
suppose, insofar as the Hegelian schtick always includes the pretense of incorporating one’s 
philosophical opponents.  So the tone of concession is always balanced by a corresponding assault.  
Natural scientific accounts of action may be possible, but they can never be complete and are never 
fully satisfying.  There may be a truth in Relativism, but that very fact points to one of its principled 
limits.  The Quietists may be right that ordinary practical reasoning is (or at least can be) perfectly self-
sufficient, but there is nonetheless an extra-ordinary philosophical discourse which teaches us 
something about the circumstances under which such self-sufficiency has become possible.  As to the 
Ancients with their fixed teleological essentialism, Pippin’s Hegel’s has one master-blow to deal 
against them:  for us no merely given essence – nothing handed down from God or Reason or Nature as 
such – can ever suffice to settle the question that is raised when one asks about the reasons for action.   
 Enough of the high altitude work.  We need to think about how this will play out in practice.  
So I suggest that we turn our attention to the ultimately nitty gritty practical matter:  What’s for dinner?  
What, if anything, could or should a Hegelian say about food and eating?  Notice, first of all, the ways 
in which our large scale battle will play out with regard to this small scale problem.  The Modern 
Naturalist can offer us a fine-grained scientific account of digestion and nutrition, the neuro-chemistry 
of appetite, the hygiene of food preparation.  The Ancient Naturalists will give us their characteristic 
advice:  eat what is fitting for you, given the essence that characterizes your kind.  (They will then 
characteristically go on to quarrel over what that essence is, and whether food should accordingly be 
raw or cooked, whether we should be vegetarians, etc.)  The Relativist will tell us, in effect, “to each 
his own.”   This is just one of those matters over which individuals and cultures vary – what is 
disgusting to me is a delicacy to you, and it is just a mistake to think that there is some fact of the 
matter to be settled here.  And the Quietists will insist that there is really no scope for any 
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philosophical account of these matters.   Everything there is to be known about food is known by the 
cooks and the agri-scientists and the nutritionists and the maîtres d … .  Philosophy has nothing to 
contribute.  So where on this map might we locate a Hegelian practical philosophy of food? 
 In thinking about this question, it may help to start with the dining habits of the Australian 
Koala (Phascolarctos cinereus).  Think, for a moment, about a koala, setting about its dinner.  A 
mature koala, as it happens, will sleep as much as twenty hours a day.  Presumably one of the reasons it 
wakes up is that it occasionally finds itself hungry.  But even this is probably to over-describe koala 
experience.  It does not find itself hungry.  It wakes up because it is hungry.  It wakes up with an 
appetite.  And what happens then?  Well, koalas only eat one thing: the leaves of eucalyptus trees.  And 
since they are tree-dwelling creatures who live in the eucalyptus forest, there is generally plenty of 
dinner about to be found.  In short, koala dining is a paragon of dietary immediacy.   Koalas never think 
about where to have dinner or what to order.  Their dietary habits are utterly governed – and perfectly 
governed – by immediate instinct.  Or, to use a word Pippin’s Hegel doesn’t like much, they are 
governed by conscience.  Koalas are endowed with an instinctive, normatively rich sense for what is 
good for them in dietary matters.  And they are so constructed that all and only that which is good to 
eat presents itself to them as food.  As the Stoics said, they live well by following nature. 
 But if koala dining is immediate, matters stand very differently with human dining.   There is 
a superficial similarity, of course.  We human beings get hungry, we find ourselves instinctively drawn 
to nourishment, we eat to satisfy our hunger.  But here the similarity ends.  If koala dining was 
immediate, human eating is saturated with mediation.  For starters, we are omnivores.  Koalas can only 
really eat one thing; human beings can eat more-or-less anything.  So we must choose.  The perfectly 
natural, animal function of eating must, for man, be mediated by some sort of mechanism for decision.  
And because of this we need all sorts of cognitive equipment to sustain this decision:  memory to recall 
what was good (or not) to eat; some medium of cultural transmission to pass this information on to our 
kin, etc.  It is worth recalling that one of the oldest functions of ancient religions was to provide dietary 
guidance.  And of course all of this is further complicated by the fact that we cook and farm – and have 
others cook and farm on our behalf.  As part of this whole package of mediation, we human beings 
come to have a relation to our appetites that is utterly unlike that enjoyed by koalas. 2  Here is Pippin’s 
Hegelian formulation: 
Hegel’s position is that some … sentient creatures do not merely embody their 
natures, in the way a stone or planet or an insect might be said simply to be what it is.  
Some come to be in some sort of mediated and self-directed relation to their 
immediately felt or experienced dispositions, sensations, and inclinations.  (51) 
So for we human beings an appetite does not immediately move us to eat.  It occurs in that loosened 
space between instinct and motion that Rousseau identified as the native soil of human freedom. 
 But looseness of instinct is not enough to make freedom – not for Rousseau and certainly not 
for Pippin’s Hegel.   The crucial question is about what comes to occupy that loosened space.  What 
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kind of answer can suffice for the question, once posed, “what ought I to eat”?   For this act of 
questioning is something quite different in kind from hunger, or the experience of hunger.  It is an 
invitation to reflection and deliberation, and it is far from clear what counts as a satisfying answer.  
Should I eat what is closest at hand?  What is healthy (according to whom and by what standard)?  Is it 
ethical to eat meat?  Should I buy local?  Eat kosher?  What about the ecological and economic 
practices that I indirectly sustain when I shop at the dominant supermarket?  Now Pippin’s Hegel is not 
much interested in these first order ethical questions; indeed there is virtually no substantive guidance 
for action in this book of Practical Philosophy.  Ultimately his concern is rather with the form of such 
questioning as such, and with the problems of freedom that are introduced once this particular barn 
door is opened. 
 Before addressing these matters, however, it is worth pausing to keep score.  Notice first the 
structure of the story we have just been telling. In Hegelian terms it is a story about the relation 
between Nature and Spirit [Geist].  The person who asks what she should eat is a geistig entity.  This is 
not to say that she is composed of some immaterial substance, nor is it to deny that she is also part of 
the natural world.  Eating is, after all, a consummately natural function.  But at some point in the 
continuum of natural being, or in the historical evolution of natural forms, a change is introduced.   
Here is how Pippin describes it: 
The suggestion Hegel appears to be making is simply that at a certain level of 
complexity and organization, natural organisms come to be occupied with themselves 
and eventually to understand themselves in ways no longer explicable within the 
boundaries of nature or in any way the result of empirical observation. (46) 
This development brings with it the need for a different kind of explanation.  Once simply cannot 
explain human dietary practices (whether in general or in some particular case) in anything like the 
way one can explain the feeding behaviour of a koala. 
 We can also now begin to see the texture of Pippin’s differences with his two Naturalist 
opponents.  A rich and complex bio-physiological account of nutrition may be a perfectly satisfying 
answer to our all our questions about koala eating.  But by itself it simply doesn’t fill the gap that opens 
up in the distinctively mediated forms of dining that characterize the human situation.  No amount of 
physiology will settle the predicament of a modern secular Jew wondering whether to eat pork; neither 
will it provide the higher-level account that Hegel seeks – an account of the personal, social and 
cultural forms of deliberation that do speak to that question.  But it should also be clear why and how 
Pippin’s Hegel cannot content himself with the position of the Ancient (Normative) Naturalist either.  
The maxim, as the Stoics put it, to live well by following nature, generates an immediate paradox for 
anyone in a position to take it seriously.  For while it is true that the animals do well by following their 
nature, anyone who starts to wonder about living well has already, in that very questioning, exhibited a 
rather distinctive nature – a nature in which following nature involves responding to reasons, and 
acting (freely) on their basis.  So how can I follow nature if my nature is to be free?   
 The centerpiece of the positive Hegelian position on these matters, at least on Pippin’s 
accounting, lies in a distinctive conception of human action and agency.  As a first approximation, the 
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Hegelian account of action is organized around an interplay between the inner (or subjective) and the 
outer (and public) dimensions of agency.  In undertaking an action, some subjective state of the agent – 
an intention, a plan, a choice – is made manifest in a public undertaking.  Or as Hegel likes to put it, 
“the content of what is thought takes on the form of being” (cited at 133).  But this is only a first, and 
inadequate approximation.  The relation between the inner and the outer dimensions of action turns out 
to be quite intricate.  For on the Hegelian account, the identity of the subjective intention cannot itself 
be fixed or identified except with reference to the outer manifestation that follows.   Suppose that I tell 
myself privately that I will give up eating meat for Lent, or kick my Diet Coke habit.  But perhaps I’m 
not all that confident about the strength of my resolve, so to avoid humiliation I don’t share my secret 
resolution with anyone else.  And sure enough, come that first lunchtime, I find myself placing my 
usual order for a burger and a soda.  Here, the Hegelian will insist, the objective, outer manifestation 
puts the lie to what I told myself about my private, subjective intention.  Properly understood I never 
seriously resolved what I thought I had. 
 Pippin’s Hegelian model is in this sense an expressivist account of action.  We can and should 
talk about intentions and actions; such discriminations are themselves partly constitutive of agency.  
But we must recognize that the inner and outer stand in a dialectically entangled relation.  My intention 
may indeed determine my action, but my actions no less come to determine the meaning, the content of 
my intentions.  But this first complexity immediately leads us to the next one.  For on the Hegelian 
account, this crucial issue about the meaning of my actions inexorably draws others into the story.  If I 
gesture in a busy restaurant to ask for the bill, or transmit what that I take to be a piece of constructive 
critical feedback to the chef, the meaning of my actions slips beyond my personal control.  The very 
nature of my action, of what I have done, is in significant measure a function of its public reception and 
interpretation.  No amount of pleading about my prior private intention can be decisive in such a 
dispute.  In this way Hegelian agency involves a complex interplay – between inner and outer, public 
and private, self and other, action and interpretation. 
 But it also essentially involves reasons and freedom.  And here we come to the richest and 
most original aspects of Pippin’s Hegelian position.  I cannot possibly hope to do full justice to 
Pippin’s proposals as to the nature of human freedom, so once again I resort to the high altitude sketch, 
followed by some consideration of its application in a problematic particular case.  Let me try to 
summarize the big picture with four key points.  First, Pippin’s Hegelian account of human freedom is 
largely divorced from considerations about causality or causal determination.   This by itself is a rather 
striking departure from the usual range of disputed positions on this topic.  Both historically and in the 
substantial recent scholarship on free agency, the central issues of dispute have revolved around the 
apparent tension between free will and causal determination, the choice between compatibilist and 
incompatibilist positions, and so on.  Incompatibilists from the Baron d’Holbach through to Galen 
Strawson hold that freedom requires, impossibly, that the agent be some kind of causa sui.   
Compatibilists have advanced an impressive array of proposals about what it is for human behaviour to 
be caused in the right way so as to constitute free action – choice for Moore, higher-order volitions for 
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Frankfurt, the “evaluational system” for Watson, and so on.  And Voluntarists from Augustine to Kant  
try to make sense of some form of quasi-causal determination of action that somehow lies outside the 
familiar empirical causal chain.  But for Pippin’s Hegel, all this is essentially barking up the wrong 
tree.  Indeed, in Pippin’s boldest formulations, Hegelian freedom has nothing to do with causation.3   
 So if not causality then what?  On Pippin’s account, the crux of human freedom lies not in an 
antecedent causal power but rather in an essentially retrospective ability for an agent to recognize her 
actions as her own.  Pippin: 
I suggest with Hegel that what we want to be able to explain when we ask ‘What is 
freedom?’ are the conditions that must be fulfilled such that my various deeds and 
projects could be, and could be experienced by me as being, my deeds and projects, 
as happening at all in some way that reflects and expresses my agency.  (36) 
It is this basic condition on freedom that Pippin sometimes describes as “the non-alienation condition” 
– freedom is lost where I experience my own activities as somehow forced upon me, or as effectively 
channeling the agency of others.  (One of Pippin’s examples involves a middle manager who is given 
the task, and the choice, of firing one of two loyal employees.)  But this should not be confused with 
the sort of “negative liberty” construal of freedom, which finds freedom in the absence of constraining 
interference from others.  On Pippin’s account, satisfying the non-alienation condition is essentially an 
accomplishment, something I attain through a complex process of appropriating (owning, if you will) 
my actions, my choices, and indeed even the circumstances under which I undertake them.   
 This brings us to the two further crucial components in Pippin’s account.  Owning my own 
actions, and in this way recognizing my agency in them, depends crucially on my relation to the 
reasons for my action.  And this in turn is tied up with the social context in which those reasons are 
adduced.  With this we come to the themes of recognition and what Pippin calls “recognitive status” 
that are explored in the third and final Part of Hegel’s Practical Philosophy.  I shall not pretend to 
provide an adequate accounting here – not even a ‘high altitude’ one.  Suffice for now to say this.  In 
order to recognize my action as my own, I must be able to recognize the reasons for my action as my 
reasons.  But at the same time, reasons can only stand in the right sort of relation to my actions insofar 
as they are genuine reasons, reasons that genuinely justify or make sense of my actions.  And once 
again this is a matter that is simply not within the control of any single individual.  What counts as a 
reason to act in one way rather than another is essentially dependent upon what is recognized, in my 
community, as a reason.  And what makes that communal context something other than a dogmatic 
imposition is not something that can be spelled out in terms of some final, fully objective set of 
reasons.  For the very notion of a reason, on this account, is linked to the practice of giving and asking 
for reasons, and such a practice must be historically and socially situated.   
                                                           
3 See, e.g., page 38:  “Contrary to most compatibilists, being free does not involve any sort of causality at all.” 
Pippin does not remain entirely faithful to this bold version of the thesis.  Characteristically, he presses it as hard 
and as fully as he can for a couple of hundred pages before finally acknowledging that some sort of causality is 
indeed involved.  (See, e.g., p 190.)   This is the (enlightening but maddening) form of Hegelian argument that 
Pippin describes as “having your cake and eating it too” (273). 
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 Even at this level of generality we can begin to see the intricacy of Pippin’s dance with his 
Relativist and Quietist opponents.  Like the Relativist, Pippin locates the business of giving reasons and 
acting freely upon them essentially in a local, historical context.   By their nature, action-justifying 
reasons cannot transcend such contexts; as we have seen, the very identity of an action depends upon 
its reception by its contingent local audience.  And this in turn seems to commit us to a form of 
Quietism, since no once-and-for-all philosophical story could settle the matter of what an action means, 
whether it is justified or free.  Philosophy must accordingly surrender its traditional ambitions to 
replace the local and contingent practices of reason-giving with a universal, objective and necessary 
form of justification.  If this is not to amount to a final surrender to the Relativist and Quietist, then the 
Hegelian must find an alternate set of ambitions.  For Pippin this alternate ambition is decidedly not the 
business of spelling out some grand, revisionist metaphysics of reality as such.  Instead, Pippin’s Hegel 
sets out to construct a history of our reason-giving practices themselves, to account for how we have 
arrived where we have, with forms of social recognition and practices of justification which can 
themselves suffice to sustain free rational agency.   
 All this threatens to become rather too abstract, so by way of conclusion I want to project it 
back onto my nitty gritty case study:  the problem of eating.  Consider a young woman suffering from 
anorexia nervosa – the eating disorder characterized by fear of weight-gain, self-starvation, and 
distorted body-image.  An anorexic makes choices about what to eat (or not to eat) and acts upon those 
choices, sometimes at the risk of considerable self-harm and even death.  Anorexia looks to be a 
paradigmatic example of pathological agency, a condition that erodes both physical and mental health 
and fosters deeply irrational, self-destructive behaviour.  So how would or could this pathology be 
described in Pippin’s Hegelian categories?  Does the anorexic act freely in refusing sustenance?  Is her 
behaviour properly understood as a manifestation of agency at all?  And if indeed we want to 
characterize her condition as pathological, then in what exactly does the pathology consist?  How these 
matters are decided can come to make an enormous difference in practice.  If anorexic self-starvation is 
an expression of rational self-determination then liberal legal regimes characteristically protect it.  In 
the UK, for instance, a competent patient has an absolute right to refuse even life-saving medical 
interventions.  If, on the other hand, it is deemed that the anorexic condition has undermined a patient’s 
agency then the tables are turned:  the patient’s absolute right is replaced by a set of paternalistic 
duties-of-care assigned to medical institutions and their staff.  Does the Hegelian model provide 
resources for navigating such cases?  I cannot hope to address these matters properly here, but it will be 
worthwhile to sketch some approaches that are (and are not) available from Pippin’s Hegelian position. 
 From what we have said it should be clear that a Hegelian account of anorexic agency could 
not turn primarily on the causes of anorexic behaviour.  If freedom “does not involve any sort of 
causality at all” (38), then the question of anorexic freedom would not be settled by discovering, for 
instance, that anorexic behaviour is caused by some genetic trait or neural trigger, or by some 
identifiable set of “infected” values.  One obvious Hegelian alternative would be to appeal to the non-
alienation condition – to a patient’s ability to identify with her actions, recognizing her choices as her 
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own.  But anorexics may seem to pass the non-alienation test all too well.  Consider this characteristic 
report from Participant D in a recent study of anorexic treatment decisions: 
I remember getting some tests back saying how my liver was really damaged and all 
this, and I thought it was really rather good.  I can’t imagine that I thought it, it felt 
like really quite an accomplishment … It’s sick, isn’t it?  It was like somehow I’d 
achieved!  And knowing I almost killed myself; no, I’d say the illness almost killed 
me, it was like, wow.  It was just I’d done something that I knew hardly anyone 
could do.4 
Part of what disturbs us here is the patient’s identification with a profoundly pathological condition.  
One might well think that this very identification is robbing the patient of her freedom.  But it is not 
easy to see how such a thought is to be accommodated in an account like Pippin’s, which finds the 
heart of free agency in an agent’s ability to identify her actions as her own. 
 A third alternative would be to follow the lead from Hegelian expressivism.  Anorexics 
characteristically claim that they are fat, even as their body mass index falls to dangerously low levels.  
They espouse preferences and values that any healthy person would certainly reject.  (“I wasn’t really 
bothered about dying, as long as I died thin”5.)  If anorexic behaviour is expressive of delusional beliefs 
and distorted values then this itself would provide the basis for counting the condition as a pathology.  
But here the question concerns the status of these assessments.  Can they be sustained without some 
form of capitulation to the teleological essentialism of the Ancient Naturalists and their contemporary 
allies?  Both eating and reasoning about eating are activities of organisms (or ‘lifeforms’) of a 
particular essential nature.  For the Normative Naturalist, the values and beliefs of the anorexic are 
pathological and delusional precisely because the anorexic’s practices of eating have become unhinged 
from their proper natural function.  But this is not a claim that is available to the strict Hegelian, who 
remains committed above all to the rejection of any “merely given” natural normativity.   
 We can now see the outlines of a difficulty for Pippin’s Hegel.  Extrapolate to a community of 
Hegelian anorexics, each identifying profoundly with their acts of self-starvation, and finding 
recognition and validation from others in their community.  The practice of giving and asking for 
reasons operates within such a community, and anorexic reasons are recognized as genuine reasons – 
relative to the distinctive values that structure this particular local world.  Members of the community 
risk their lives, to be sure, but they do so in pursuing something that they value above mere biological 
existence.  To round out the Hegelian picture we can add in a reflective apologist, constructing just-so 
historical narratives that celebrate the anorexic commitment to “break the power of natural inclination” 
--  finding therein the culmination of mankind’s emergence from its merely animal nature.  Does the 
Hegelian have to concede that anorexia has here become a paradigm of modern free agency? 
 But if Pippin’s account creates these sorts of problems for the Hegelian, it should be clear that 
he also creates opportunities.  Consider again the report from Participant D (quoted above).  In it we 
can see much of the texture of agency with which Pippin has taught us to concern ourselves.  
                                                           
4 Participant D, quoted in Tan et al. “Competence to Make Treatment Decisions in Anorexia Nervosa: Thinking 
Processes and Values” Philosophy, Psychiatry and Philosophy 13:4 (2006), 267-282; see page 276.  Participant I 
in the same study emphasizes how the disease formed “part of my identity”.  
5 Patient I, Tan et al. 2006, 274. 
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Participant D is reflective and retrospective.  Although she recalls her earlier identification with her 
disorder, she has come to externalize it.  (“I almost killed myself; no, I’d say the illness almost killed 
me.”)  Notice here the doubly first-personal voice, a characteristic structure of Hegelian agency.  The 
first ‘I’ is that of the remembered participant consciousness; the second that of the remembering and 
reconstructing phenomenological observer.  And of course both voices are here speaking in the 
distinctive context of the psychiatric interview, in which an agent is invited to externalize (render 
public) her inner (private) motives and reasons.  In all this we find the essential structures of Hegelian 
agency and freedom:  actions and their meanings are essentially extended over time and social space; 
action is possible only for a being who remembers and reinterprets, and whose reasons can be 
recognized (and challenged) in an essentially social encounter.  Action is thus always at least 
proleptically political, and freedom can be neither exercised nor assessed synchronically or 
individually, but only by considering the dynamic, diachronic, intersubjective and recognitional 
structures in which it is essentially embedded.   
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